

THE REFORM OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

WHO WILL BELL THE CAT?

*“No reform of the UN will be complete without
the reform of the Security Council”—*

Kofi Annan

(Gould and Rablen:146)

This paper charts the milestones in the oft demanded structural and functional reforms of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). A body originally conceived as the guardian of international political stability, more than half century later, “the UNSC (still) remains the most authoritative institution on international peace and security issues”. The clarion calls for reform, since the last century, underscore the importance of the UNSC for the sustenance and legitimacy of rule-based international order. The 2005 World Summit outcome document states that, through reform the Council can be made “broadly representative, efficient and transparent and thus to enhance its effectiveness and the legitimacy and implementation of its decisions”.

RISHYA DHARMANI

The “reform of the security council” is a term proposed by Edward Luke to indicate “attempts and/or acts of modifying the composition, the status and the voting powers of the members as well as the decision-making procedure of the Security Council”. (*Bourantonis Dimitris, (2005), The History and Politics of UN*

Security Council Reform, Routledge) It is a commentary on the aspirations of sovereign states to alter or retain the distribution of the current balance of power. *It is curious that many states struggle to bandwagon with an institution whose foundations stand contrary to the principles of the UN: universality and sovereign equality.* Despite repeated assaults on the UN decrying its ineffectiveness, the distinct “collective security” system instituted by the UNSC has retained its aura.

POLITICS OF REFORM

“**A**t UN level the SC reform has been debated in 5 components: categories of members, the right to veto, the level of extension, working methods and the relation to the General Assembly”. (<https://www.mae.ro/en/node/16885>) This article will consider them under two broad categories of “functional” and “structural” reforms. Bourantonis refers to this distinction as *de jure* and *de facto* changes. (*Bourantonis Dimitris, ibid*) As reforms reflect the question of gaining legitimacy by broadening membership and improving functional aspects like transparency—they have the capacity to bring authority and accountability in the working of the UNSC.

Gerhart Niemeyer in *Law Without Force* (1941) had dismissed the idea of collective security as utopian—and it proved true in the last half century when the UNSC was unable to carry its mandate. It remained as the sitting duck of the East vs West conflict during the Cold War. Josef L. Kunz in his seminal article mentions that the UN collective security system failed as Charter Requirements under Articles 43 and 106 were never brought through (Franck). As the United States and Soviet Union served their client states, change in Cold War dynamics shifted the politics to North vs South. The declining clout of the Soviet Union and its support to the G-77 opened issues like global economic inequality, great power politics, and sovereign concerns of smaller states. George W. Bush in September 2002 addressed the General Assembly to state: “We created the United Nations Security Council so that, unlike the League of Nations, our deliberations would be more than talk, our resolutions would be more than wishes”. (*Weiss, T.G. (2003) “The Illusion of UN Security Council Reform”, The Washington Quarterly, 26, pp-147-161*)

It is ironic that the UNSC as the hallmark of the UN system (which itself “reformed” and learned from the League’s failure) was questioned for its “consistent inconsistency” of apathy and inaction against ongoing conflicts. There were “protection crisis(es)” in DRC, the Sudan, Somalia, Sri Lanka where not only the concerned state, its immediate neighbourhood, and the UNSC failed

to act responsibly. (Bellamy Alex (2015), “R2P turns Ten”, *Ethics and International Affairs*, Vol 29 (2), pp161-185) This reflected the continuous clashes resulting from demands of middle and second tier powers like India, Brazil and others resisting “external interference” {Article 2(7)} to conserve sovereignty against UNSC’s adventurism.

An interesting case on how the politics has changed is the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/R2P-Final-Report%201.pdf>), which has called for “veto restraint” in *jus cogens* crimes of crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide. This is indicative of transition from the humanitarian intervention principle which came under severe criticism during the UNSC sanctioned NATO’s “humanitarian bombing” of Bosnia, to R2P. R2P or Responsibility to Protect was affirmed by UNSC. It was successfully vetted by ICISS in 2001 report, where under the third pillar the international community can use force as a last resort against a state which fails to protect its own citizens. It has also broadened its mandate to ensure “international peace and security” by bringing Protection of Civilian (POC) (Report by the Secretariat on procedural developments in the Council in 2001) norms to shift its focus from statist to non-statist conception of security.

Functional Reforms

Since changes in operational aspects or “cluster 2 reforms” do not expedite a charter amendment, it is easier to see them through. The UN in its publication S/2006/78 described such operational reforms from 1993 to 2005. “Over the years, member states have repeatedly called on the Council to update the Rules of Procedure to reflect the Council’s changing work reality and to terminate the rules’ ‘provisional’ status. The Rules of Procedure, which were adopted in 1946 as ‘provisional’, are still considered transient to this day, more than 70 years later. Yet they constitute the only official set of rules guiding the working methods of the Council. They have been revised seven times, but all the revisions were minor. Moreover, none were made in the post-Cold War era.” (Security Council Report, “Security Council Working Methods: Provisional Progress”, (Accessed March 2019), URL: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/research_report_working_methods_2018.pdf) Generally noncontroversial they refer to the Council’s enhanced role in effective monitoring of sanctions regimes, country specific arrangements for peacebuilding, role of non-state actors in the UNSC mandates and opportunities for non-Council members to air their concerns.

It is often believed that smaller and less powerful states and their coalitions suggested such amends as they were unable to propose more drastic changes. They

want to gain better access to the UNSC and improved operability in crisis. Their demands revolve around transparency, accountability and participation. Thus, when the heydays of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) were over, they submitted a negotiating paper to strengthen and institutionalise the working of UNSC. It called for strict adherence of Council's reports to the General Assembly in accordance with GA resolution 51/193 of December 17, 1996. To promote transparency the SC should hold open and informal meetings, consult with troop contributing countries and make its draft resolutions public. It demanded accountability from the SC by insisting on limitation of veto only to actions taken under Chapter VII and insisting that the subsidiary organs established by UNSC should be open to participation of all member states.

In the wake of an increasing call for institutionalisation of such norms and working of the Council, in 1993 the

latter established an informal subsidiary body, the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions (IWG). It produced a single volume compilation of the Council's working methods known as "Note 507", the most recent being in 2017 under the chairmanship of Japan which suggested:

- *Changes in the 'penholder system'*: "Desirability of at least one round of discussions with all members of the Council on all drafts and of providing reasonably sufficient time for consideration" (*Security Council Report: 9*) Ensuring that any member of the Council based on their experience can become the "penholder". It also stressed the right of any member to extend the period of 'silence procedure'
- *Council's dialogue with non-members*: It called for annual joint consultations and informal dialogues with the African Union's Peace and Security Council
- *Appointment of chairs of the subsidiary bodies*: With participation of all members of the Council and facilitation of the process by two chosen members

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- *Making the annual open debates on the Council's working practices a "sanctioned practice" (Presidential Statement SIPRST/2015/19)*
- *A marked emphasis on efficiency in the Council's meetings by encouraging the members to make short and concise statements*
- *Positive role of the President to enable the Secretariat's communication with each member and making its briefings user-friendly.*
- *The Notes cautioned on the increasingly tenuous relationship of the Council with several subsidiary bodies (PBC and Sanctions Committee)*

The fact that functional reform is the call of broader UN membership and not only the select few was made clear in the 2005 World Summit where it was affirmed "we recommend that the Security Council continue to adapt its working methods so as to increase the involvement of States not members of the Council in its work, as appropriate, enhance its accountability to the membership, and increase the transparency of its work". (A/RES/60/1)

Table 1.1 Intergovernmental and other transnational grouping on functional aspects of UNSC reform

Group	Demands	Members
Troop Contributing Countries (TCC)/ Police Contributing Countries (PCC)	Concerned with how the decision-making of Council and to ensure accountability, transparency and participation	
Accountability Coherence Transparency (ACT)	ACT released a Code of Conduct to make UNSC members to pledge to not to scuttle its action against genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity	Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan, Liechtenstein, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania and Uruguay
Small 5 (S5)	"Specific modifications (...in) the relationship of Council subsidiary bodies with an impact of sanctions on the membership at large; the interaction between the Council and troop contributors; the relations with regional organisations; and better and more effective integration of new members of the Council" (Security Council Report :9) Coordination between Council, General Assembly and ECOSOC	Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland

There were proposals from within the Council too. In a Memorandum by the Elected Members on Transparency in the Security Council (1997) (<https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/security-council-reform/transparency-including-working-methods-and-decisionmaking-process/32868.html?itemid=914>) the non-permanent members submitted their proposals to the President of the SC (many of which were accepted). They demanded that before imposition of sanctions on a regime, the concerned state should be given an audience in the UNSC (Article 50); the Sanctions Committee should bring transparency by providing minutes of each meeting. Responding to the growing clamour, the US published a “Fact Sheet” in 2001 to support the reform calls if they bring “capacity and effectiveness and enhances its representative character without detracting from its working efficiency”.

By far the most comprehensive evaluation of the reform process has been carried out by the Working Group. In 1997 it proposed the following functional changes: (*Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council*)

Meetings of the Council—Article 28 mandates the SC to organise its work for efficiency and smooth functioning. The UNSC should let the member states “(to) be represented by other than their current representatives...(*Also, the Provisional Rule 1 (PR1) states (that the Security Council has)*) committed itself to meet at intervals not exceeding 14 days... and to hold periodic meetings twice a year (PR 4)”. (*Ibid*) As a recent innovation, member states carry out informal and private consultations to ascertain and mould the others’ views—as recently witnessed in backdoor diplomacy carried to blacklist Masood Azhar. (<https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/us-france-and-uk-compromise-china-masood-azhar-listing-1479353-2019-03-16>) The document suggested making the SC’s meetings public, as a rule, barring few exceptions.

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PROGRAMME OF THE WORK OF THE COUNCIL

The practice has been to chalk out tentative agendas of the meetings where the President interacts informally with member states “on the tentative forecast of the programme of the work for the month”. The Secretariat is also actively engaged in item setting. The SC has now made such agendas available to members (with exceptions) and the Working Group called for making the provisional agenda in the form of reports and draft resolutions to be featured in the Journal of the United Nations.

Briefings by the President to Non-members and Making UNSC Documents Public

The internal deliberations in the Council are not officially recorded and if the position of a member is modified and accepted it is marked by an S/-symbol in the draft resolution. In a major breakthrough for transparency and accountability the President, with the consent of members, appraises the non-members and public at large of what had transpired in such informal meetings. There were calls for regularising this practice and making the draft resolutions public.

Consultations with The Troop Contributing Countries

As peacekeeping missions have become increasingly complex, discussions with major contributors have transformed from bilateral level consultations within the Secretariat to regular briefings from the latter to governments. The “use of force in certain circumstances” requires mutual consent over the frequency, duration, capacity and mandate of such missions. The then Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s demand in the *Agenda for Peace* was met by institutionalising a standby agreement system where individual countries promise resources for immediate assistance. The Brahimi Report *The Brahimi Report or Report on the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations suggested clear and achievable mandates to peacekeeping operations which have become a major work of the Council. It also stressed on situation specific military know-how for mission deployment.* had suggested deployment of integrated missions where an assessment of the available resources and the situation on the ground is carried out beforehand. The Working Group submitted that consideration should be given to countries

involved in multifaceted missions and providing civilian contributions.

Transparency and Legitimacy of Security Council's Working

A recent innovation, the “Arrias formula” is seen as a breath of fresh air in the power-packed Council. The member state(s) can sponsor an eminent person with an international reputation to have a “frank exchange” with other members. The Working Group mentions a subsidiary, the “Somavia formula”, where the members can hear the concerns of international NGOs.

Interaction of the Council with UN Member States

In pursuance of Article 50 where a state facing “special economic problems” due to the UNSC’s sanctions can consult it. The Working Group suggests relief by the Council to such state based on “automaticity of application”. It also suggests some mechanism to intimate non-member states of the UNSC of its scheduled and upcoming meetings.

Interaction of the Council and Other UN Organs

The Working Group called on the Council to increasingly refer interstate disputes to the ICJ (Article 36) and also seek its advisory opinions. With respect to the General Assembly, there were initial hiccups given the *Uniting for Peace* resolution which encroached upon the fundamental function of the Council. Nevertheless, it is suggested that the Presidents of the Council and the Assembly should have a regular exchange of views every month, especially in the context of major international crises.

Interactions of the Council with Regional Arrangements, Organisations and Agencies

Chapters VII and VIII spell out the Council’s mandate to call upon regional groupings to enforce collective action for maintenance of international peace

and security. Such regional organisations are given a “free” hand to carry out such measures on their own accord also (OAS in Haiti, OAU in Burundi and AU in the Sudan). Several disreputable engagements by NATO and “coalitions” of states stressed the need for accountability and caution in calling a regional formation for help. The Council has instituted an Agenda for Peace subgroup for coordination on this matter.

Decision Making in the Council

Despite the adoption of the General Assembly resolution 267(III) of April 14, 1949, the Council has kept on deliberating on matters without having a clear definition of procedural and substantive issues. The stalemate still remains as such an exercise is also subject to veto. According to Article 52(3), members party to a dispute under consideration before the Council must obligatorily abstain from voting. The Working Group proposed changes to the action threshold where, to accept a resolution all P5 and four non-permanent members must agree to it. A major reform was proposed to nullify a single veto if the majority of the Council agrees to the proposed action. *Even in the 1945 San Francisco conference, Australia and nine other nations had sought to remove veto power unsuccessfully.* It also suggested “Articles 4(2), 5, 6, 27, 97, 108 and 109 [are] changed with a view to limiting or abolishing the application of the veto”. As an alternative it was recommended that a permanent member may cast a negative vote without willfully categorising it as a veto or the P5 issuing a unilateral declaration not to use the veto. Another proposal calls for weighted voting based on a state’s population and its contribution to the UN. Even in the 1945 San Francisco conference, Australia and nine other nations had sought to remove veto power unsuccessfully.

Subsidiary Organs of the Council

Such bodies include a recently created Ombudsperson to the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee to study the requests of individuals, states and organisations for delisting. This is a major step towards having an impartial and independent punitive action free from power politics. Another improvement is giving the status of “no objection” procedure to humanitarian supplies to non-member states. With respect to the ICTR and ICTY (the special courts

appointed for war crimes in Rwanda and Yugoslavia) there has been scepticism on the quantum of punishments given whereas the “big sharks” remain free from penalties and clashes multiply with the host (and successor) states.

STRUCTURAL REFORMS

The membership reform is a deeply contested issue. An UN publication A/48/264 Add. 1-10 states that majority of members support reform but fail to concur in its nature, even as C. Eduardo Vargas Toro points to the common knowledge that the UNSC is not representative of world’s realities. It has created an institutional struggle between bourgeois (veto yielding countries) and proletariat (non-veto states), driving a wedge between claimants to permanent status and their rivals without improving the Council’s accountability and efficiency. Conversely, any reform that threatens the hegemonic permanence of P5 will not be tolerated in the near future. (*Toro 2008*) The reform process is also cumbersome as it requires: “First, a minimum of 128 members of the General Assembly must cast an affirmative vote to adopt a reform plan. During this vote, those abstaining or absent are not counted and there is no requirement that all permanent members must vote to approve the plan at this stage. Second, once the plan is approved by the General Assembly, it must be ratified by the national legislatures of two-thirds of member countries, including all of the permanent-member countries”. (*Martini:9*)

Though demands have been going on since 1979, it was in September 1992 that India and 35 other states tabled the draft resolution A/RES/47/62 for formally making their demand of equitable representation in the item of the UNGA. Such a proposal was only considered after a unanimous resolution in December 1992 which officially placed calls for reform on the agenda. In response to multiple such proposals the UNGA passed the resolution A/RES/48/26 to form an Open-ended “Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council” for formal consultations regarding membership and operational reform. “The Working Group is open to all Member States. The President of the General Assembly is the chairman of the group and presides over the meetings, which usually, but not always, takes place in the first semester of the year. At the end of a General Assembly Session the chairman presents a draft status report and a resolution to the membership. The report outlines the progress made during the Session and is a publicly available document. If both

report and resolution are passed, the item will then be placed on the agenda of the following General Assembly Session, and the Working Group can continue its work”. (Center for UN Reform Education, (2013), *Governing and Managing Change at the United Nations: reform of the Security Council From 1945 to September 2015, Volume 1, New York*)

Table 1.2 Possible reform routes

Type of Reform	Proposals
“E10”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase the power of 10 non-permanent members by reforming their election procedure, providing them with a secretariat body and institutionalising the Council’s presidency • In another proposal, the <i>Uniting for Consensus</i> proposed a “Green model” to add 10 non-permanent members on regional basis
“Model A”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6 new permanent seats with no veto • 3 new two-year term elected seats
“Model B”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • new category of 8 seats, renewable every four years • 1 new two-year non-renewable seat

The outcome was the Razali Reform Paper (Open-Ended Working Group on The Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council) which proposed a three staged reform plan: “to increase the membership of the Security Council from fifteen to twenty-four by adding five permanent and four non-permanent members;

- a) that the five new permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern:
- (i) One from the developing States of Africa;
 - (ii) One from the developing States of Asia;
 - (iii) One from the developing States of Latin America and the Caribbean;
 - (iv) Two from industrialised States;
- b) that the four new non-permanent members of the Security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern:
- (i) One from African States;
 - (ii) One from Asian States;
 - (iii) One from Eastern European States;
 - (iv) One from Latin American and Caribbean States” (*Razali Proposal*)

In 2004, the *High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* released a report to propose “Model A” and “Model B” reforms suggesting enlargement of

the Council to 24 seats. This resulted in high level deliberations and formation of a *Uniting for Consensus* group which sought to undermine G4’s quest by calling for consensus and garnering support of the Arab League and others. Both the clashing groups tabled rival reports in the General Assembly before the 2005 World Summit. The African group also submitted its own set of demands in the ‘Sirte Declaration’ and Ezulwini Consensus.

Table 1.3 Major groups within UN on structural reforms

Coalition or Groupings	Demands	Members
<i>Uniting for Consensus (erstwhile Coffee Club)</i>	Increase non-permanent members according to regional balance Resists demands by other states to seek permanent seats as it will violate UN principle of “sovereign equality” Bases its argument on “Cascade Effect” <i>The privileges accorded to permanent members like “right to sit on the various boards of the UN system and appoint nationals to senior Secretariat positions” lead to an “asphyxiating gasp” (Freiesleben: 3)</i> Longer term seats on a rotational basis for Asia, Africa, GIRULAC, EEG, WEOG	Italy, Pakistan, Spain, Argentina, Canada, Mexico, South Korea
<i>Group of Four (G4)</i>	Demand permanent status based on increasing role within and outside the UN system	India, Germany, Japan, Brazil
<i>Ezulwini Consensus</i>	Despite the UN’s major work to be in Africa, the continent is not represented in the UNSC by a single member Departed from Harare Declaration 1997 by calling for two permanent seats (but internal divisions over which state should be recommended)	adopted by the African Union in 2005
<i>League of Arab States</i>	UN has 21 Arab member states which are inhabited by 12% of the world population Support broadening of membership based on equitable geographic representation and sovereign equality of member states Call for at least two non-permanent seats and a permanent seat to be rotated among Arab states	Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, the Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Somalia

“Germany and Japan based their claims on the grounds that they are major donors. India did so as the world’s second largest country in terms of population, with one of the world’s largest economies and the third largest contributor of

troops to UN peacekeeping missions. Brazil based its case on being the largest country in terms of territory, population and economy in South America.” (*Centre for UN Reform Education: 3*) Italy emerged as a serious contender in the 1990s with an increase in its contribution to UN budget and peacekeeping forces. But now it is more interested in resisting Germany’s quest for a permanent seat as the latter will become a political power centre within EU where it already is the dominant economic actor.

This complex geopolitics has ensured that no single conception of reform can be accepted. A furore erupted in 2005 when a compromise was achieved between the G4 and the African Union to have a 25-member Council with six new permanent members (G4 and two from Africa). This supposed deal was rejected due to internal squabbles in the AU with then President of Zimbabwe Mugabe opposing South Africa and Nigeria. In 2008, the Open Working Group proposed a novel transitional approach to ensure flexibility and consensus where “member States would agree on basic reforms now, with a view to revisiting them at a mandatory review conference to take place after an agreed-upon period; at which time states could reverse or amend their previous agreed upon arrangements”. (*Von Freiesleben Jonas, Reform of the Security Council, [Online:Web] (Accessed March 2019) URL: <https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/032008reform.pdf>*)

The success of block politics prompted the S5 to submit “a draft resolution (A/60/L.49) (in 2006) under the agenda item *Follow up to the Millennium Summit* aimed at achieving a more accountable and transparent Security Council. The draft asked the Council to consult with all Member States on resolutions, and requested that the five permanent members explain every veto to the General Assembly”. (*Freiesleben: 8*) This innovative idea of reporting to the General Assembly was however rejected even by the hopefuls for permanent seats.

Another milestone was the notion of “transitional proposal” floated by Panama to change the current outlook of the Council by creating more non-permanent members who would be given permanent seats if re-elected later, but without veto powers. But as it was rejected, there were attempts to reach an ‘intermediary arrangement’ to strike a common ground since none of the groups had enough support to pass a General Assembly resolution. This approach was partly successful as during IGN GA72 2018 the members agreed in their quest to expand the Council to 21-27 seats by expansion of the number of two-year non-permanent members or an increase in permanent seats or creation of a new category of longer term non-permanent seats. Such an enlargement of Council should be based on “categories of membership” (*GA decision 62/557*) and “regional representation”.

Earlier, many states including Japan and India were not satisfied with the facilitators' reports. They launched a massive effort to include their unaddressed concerns in the reform process. This move brought together India, Brazil, South Africa (IBSA) and Nigeria. (*The participation of Nigeria in this proposal led to serious concerns within the AU that it has been promised a second permanent seat from Africa by G4 and IBS*) This surprise move led to standoff between India and Pakistan in the Working Group. The sponsors were later forced to pull back their "L69" proposal. This, according to many observers, led the G4 and others to seek ways outside the Working Group to pursue reforms for which they were criticised by the *Uniting for Consensus* group. Whereas the former insists on decisions by vote the latter (particularly Italy and Pakistan) stress on a consensual approach.

THE WAY FORWARD

Scholars have concurred on five major problems of the Council: secrecy, arbitrary functioning of subsidiary organs, lack of accountability, lack of commitment to its policies and the issue of representation. (*Koskenniemi Martii, (1996), "The Place of Law in Collective Security", Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol 17 (2), pp- 456-488*) Given the role of several intergovernmental processes and non-state actors, it is hoped that in the near future the Council will seek legitimacy and transparency in its actions. Its procedural rules have still not been fully institutionalised despite repeated attempts.

The membership reform process has been at the tail end, given that contenders like Germany and Japan seem to have run out of steam for their claims to permanent status. Now global sentiments support developing and Third World aspirations to the privileged status. India faces obstacles over the role of its arch-rival Pakistan and the latter's benefactor China. Brazil and South Africa are also opposed by regional rivals and realise the need to consolidate their positions in their respective continents. As the African Union is not likely to move from its position of demanding veto power for new permanent members, any consensus on these issues seems distant. As newer and diverse groupings like MINT and S5 emerge, the stage is set for turf battles. The reform of the UN Security Council stakes not only the latter's own reputation and credibility but the acceptability of the United Nations at large. It is in the interest of all to preserve and consolidate the rules-based international order and preserve its most representative symbol—the United Nations Security Council.  DI2542021UNSCRD@2023